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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
CPLR 506(b)(2) is substantially a restatement of CPA 1287.19
However, under the CPLR an article 78 proceeding against certain
bodies or officers must be brought in Albany County,100 whereas the
CPA laid venue in any county within the third judicial district. This
statutory innovation is applicable only to article 78 proceedings; 101
other causes of action against those designated in 506(b)(2) have dif-
ferent venue requirements. 102
In Posner v. Rockefeller,1 3 the appellate division, characterizing
the lower court's order as one flying in the face of the statute, rea-
soned that CPLR 506(b)(2) was the controlling venue provision despite
the fact that only one of the respondents, the Comptroller, was within
its ambit, and therefore held that the motion for a change of venue
to Albany County should have been granted.
It should be remembered that the motion for a change of venue
cannot be made by a court sua sponte; hence, there is danger of an
inadvertent waiver.104 It should also be noted that where there are
two or more express venue provisions which conflict,10 5 CPLR 502
governs and the court "shall order as the place of trial one proper
... as to at least one of the parties or claims."
ARTICLE 22 - STAY, MOTIONS, ORDERS AND MANDATES
CPLR 2212(a): "Adjoining county" theory not utilized by New York
City Civil Court.
Motion practice in the New York City Civil Court is, for the most
part, governed by the CPLR.106 Nonetheless, CPLR 2212(a) which
provides that a motion in an action in the supreme court may be
heard "in the judicial district where the action is triable or in any
county adjoining the county where the action is triable," has not been
made applicable to the city court.107 An examination of a recent case,
Fox v. Montenegro, °8 raises the question whether the section should
so apply.
99 Fmsr REP. 21.
100 The provision is made explicit in CPLR 7804(b).
101 It is not applicable, for example, to a declaratory judgment action, New York
Central R.R. v. Lefkowitz, 12 N.Y.2d 305, 189 N.E.2d 695, 239 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1963); nor,
a garnishment proceeding, Butler v. State, 47 Misc. 2d 365, 262 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Broome
County Ct. 1965).
102 See, e.g., CPLR 7002(b).
103 33 App. Div. 2d 683, 305 N.Y.S.2d 852 (1st Dep't 1969).
104 CPLR 511.
105 An action against the Public Service Commission triable in Albany County (CPLR
506) and the New York City Transit Authority triable in New York County (CPLR 505)
would present such a conflict.
106 CCA 1001.
107 See 29A McKINNlY's CCA 1001, commentary 159 (1963). See also SEcoND REP. 182.
108 61 Misc. 2d 1, 804 N.YS.2d 624 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Kings County 1969).
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In Fox, the plaintiff had commenced an action in the Kings
County Division of the New York City Civil Court which was dismissed
from the trial calendar because of plaintiff's nonappearance. Due to
a clerical error in his venue caption, the plaintiff's subsequent motion
to restore the case to the calendar was heard in the New York County
Division. Failing to notice the error, defendants' attorneys contested
the motion on the merits. However, defendants later contended that
the New York County Division did not have jurisdiction to grant
plaintiff's motion.
In rejecting this argument, the court reiterated the distinction
between jurisdiction and venue: the entire New York City Civil Court
had jurisdiction over the cause of action; 10 9 the defendants' conten-
tion that the motion was heard in an improper division of the court
was a venue objection. 110 As such, the failure to properly raise it was
deemed a waiver."'
The "adjoining county" theory contained in CPLR 2212(a) was
not discussed by the court. 112 This theory can serve a two-fold pur-
pose: it may be used to alleviate the heavy motion calendar of a
particular court while safeguarding against motions being made re-
turnable in a distant court which is inaccessible to a practitioner. Its
employment in the supreme court is conceptually sound in view of
the jurisdictional relationship between the various courts: namely,
the New York Supreme Court as a single entity has jurisdiction over
an action brought in any of its parts. 113 In contrast, the adjoining
county theory could not be utilized in one of the county courts since
such court has jurisdiction only of matters pending within the county
wherein it is situated.114 However, since the composite of the New
York City Civil Court is analogous to that of the supreme court, it
seems that an "adjoining district" theory could validly be posited.
One caveat: it is doubtful whether CPLR 2212(a) will be applied
by the New York City Civil Court in cases similar to Fox since one
court is asked to pass upon intimate calendar questions of another
109 Id. at 3, 304 N.Y.S.2d at 636. Cf. Revona Realty Corp. v. Wasserman, 4 App. Div.
2d 444, 166 N.Y.S.2d 960 (3d Dep't 1957). In Revona it was indicated that the New York
State Supreme Court is a single entity. Thus, when jurisdiction of an action is invoked
by one division, the court as an entity obtains jurisdiction. See also THIRD RE. 178.
110 See Fimm REP. 16.
111 Cf. Powers v. Delaware S. Hudson R.R., 15 App. Div. 2d 620, 222 N.YS.2d 362
(3d Dep't 1961).
112 Nevertheless, reference to the theory was made by the parties; see Affidavit in
Support of Defendants' Motion at 3; Affidavit in Opposition to Defendants' Motion at 3,
Fox v. Montenegro, 61 Misc. 2d 1, 304 N.Y.S.2d 624 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Kings County 1969).
113 See note 109 supra.
114 THm REP. 178.
1970]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
court."15 Nevertheless, by analogy, GPLR 2212(a) should be utilized
by the civil court in those instances where motion practice in the
supreme court would warrant its application. The jurisdictional jus-
tification is present; a literal interpretation of CPLR 2212(a) should
not be employed to prevent its adoption in the New York City Civil
Court.
ARTICLE 31 -DISCLOSURE
CPLR 3101(a): Courts continue to grant liberal disclosure of wit-
nesses' names.
Prior to the enactment of the CPLR, the names of witnesses
were rarely the proper subject of disclosure." 6 Nevertheless, various
exceptions to this stringent approach arose."17 In recognition of the
logic underlying these exceptions, CPLR 3101(a), as originally pro-
posed,"18 emulated the "relevancy" standard utilized in the federal
courts."19 Although rejected legislatively, the federal standard was
gradually adopted by the judiciary. This liberal construction of the
disclosure article was ultimately sanctioned by the New York Court
of Appeals' decision in Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co.1 20
where "material and necessary" was virtually interpreted to mean
"relevant."' 2' In short, the trend is now clearly toward an interpreta-
tion of CPLR 3101 providing for prolific disclosure. 22
Continuing this trend, the New York City Civil Court, in Beyer
v. New York Telephone Co., 23 recently permitted disclosure of the
identity of a witness who, though not present at the time of the ac-
cident, arrived five to ten minutes thereafter and drove the plaintiff
home. The witness was deemed to be so closely related to the occur-
115 Discretion permits the "motion court" to transfer the motion to the trial court
in a supreme court action. See Baker, Voorhis & Co. v. Heckman, 28 App. Div. 2d 673,
280 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1st Dep't 1967); 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 2212, supp. commentary 14
(1969).
116 Hartley v. Ring, 58 Misc. 2d 618, 620, 296 N.Y.S.2d 394, 395 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1969). See The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 140 (1969).
117 For example, in Pistana v. Pangborn, 2 App. Div. 2d 643, 151 N.Y.S.2d 742 (3d
Dep't 1956), disclosure was permitted on the theory that the witness was an "active par-
ticipant" in the events upon which plaintiff relied.
118 See Fi~sT REP. 117.
119 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b): "the deponent may be examined regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action ...
including ... the identity ... of persons having knowledge of relevant facts." (Emphasis
added.) See also 4 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.19, at 124142 (2d ed. 1968).
12021 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d 430, 288 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1968). See also The Quarterly
Survey, 43 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 324 (1968).
121 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3101, commentary 11 (1970).
122 See 3 W. K. & M. 3101.11.
123 61 Misc. 2d 222, 305 N.Y.S.2d 265 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1969).
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